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Abstract  
China has accelerated and deepened bank reform since it joined the WTO in 2001. Employing a 
stochastic distance function, this paper investigates the technical efficiency of banks and examines the 
static, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes on bank efficiency in China for the period 
1995-2005. Our results show that bank efficiency has been improved and state-owned banks still 
perform poorly except for a noticeable improvement from 2003. Strong selection effects are found from 
both the foreign acquisition and going-public reform strategies. Foreign acquisition may benefit bank 
efficiency in the long run, but going-public appears to have just some short run effects. One obvious 
policy implication is that foreign competition is beneficial to China’s on-going bank reform, and going-
public is just a means to allow effective foreign competition.  
 
JEL classification: D21, L32, P31 




1.  Introduction 
2.  Chinese banking system and efficiency literature 
3.  Methodologies 
4.  Data and empirical methods 
5.  Empirical results 
6.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary 
State-owned commercial banks reform is an important part of China’s economic reform over the last two 
decades. When China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, many pundits 
believed that China’s four large state-owned commercial banks would not be able to face up to the tough 
foreign competition. Consequently, China had to accelerate and deepen its bank reform as soon as it 
joined the WTO. The latest and most radically reform involved two important strategies: foreign acquisition 
and going public. Foreign acquisition takes various forms from strategic alliance to direct buying of shares 
and stake of Chinese banks. From 1998 to 2006, the government stripped off 2.57 billion RMB of non-
performing loans from the four large state banks and injected massive fresh capital to enable them to be 
listed in the stock exchanges. The successful IPOs of Bank of China, China Construction Bank and 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 2005 and 2006 and their extraordinarily bullish performance 
in the stock markets are a cornerstone of China’s bank reform.  
To analyse and test how such reforms have transformed China’s banks, this paper employs a stochastic 
distance function to investigate the technical efficiency of banks and examines the static, selection and 
dynamic effects of governance changes on bank efficiency for 31 national and regional commercial banks 
over the period 1995-2005. The sample banks represent 85% of China’s total banking assets and 
activities. The empirical results show that bank efficiency has been improved but state-owned banks still 
perform poorly except for a noticeable improvement from 2003. Strong selection effects are found from 
both the foreign acquisition and going-public reform strategies. Foreign acquisition may benefit bank 
efficiency in the long run, but going-public appears to have just some short run effects. One obvious policy 
implication is that foreign competition is beneficial to China’s on-going bank reform, and going-public is 
just a means to allow effective foreign competition. The super bullish performance of China’s listed banks 
partly reflect their efficiency improvement as a result of ownership diversification and foreign competition, 
but more so as a result of positive expectation of domestic and foreign investors on China’s future 
economic prospects.  
 1. Introduction 
The Chinese banking system has experienced fundamental structural changes and reforms 
along with China’s comprehensive economic reform since 1978. The aim is to transform 
the sector from a state-owned, monopolistic and policy-driven to a multi-ownership, 
competitive and profit-oriented system.  However, the pace of bank reform has lagged far 
behind the reform in the real economic sectors. With the rules and obligations set by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), domestic banks have to compete with foreign banks on 
a level playing field from 2007 onwards. Accordingly, China has accelerated and deepened 
its bank reform since it joined the WTO in 2001.  
With a sequence of capital injections and stripping-off of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
from 1998 amounting to 2.57 trillion RMB, the Bank of China (BOC), the China 
Construction Bank (CCB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) have 
successfully made their initial public offering (IPO) in the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchanges. The market reaction to these IPOs was highly positive from the second half of 
2006, with their share prices rocketing by up to 100%, making them among the few largest 
firms in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Based on market values, ICBC is now the second 
largest bank in the world, second only to Citigroup.  
Recent reforms have focused on ownership shift of state-owned banks in the hope of 
enhancing corporate governance to improve efficiency. Foreign acquisition and IPO are 
two major strategies of reforming state-owned banks. The underpinning economic theories 
are the principal-agent problem and soft budgetary constraints. Both are possible sources of 
inefficiency because that agent (management) may not act on the best interests of the 
principal (the owner) and a soft budget constraint gives rise to a moral hazard problem. 
These strategies are expected to change banks’ corporate governance and result in a hard 
budget, helping to resolve the agency and moral hazard problems. These reform measures 
are also grounded on the mounting empirical findings in which state-ownership is generally 
found less efficient. 
A five-year grace period of WTO has elapsed. Chinese banks have become a real player in 
an open market without a government protecting umbrella. A number of research questions 
are of particular importance and interest. How efficient are Chinese banks? How those 
reform efforts affect bank efficiency? What are the effects of foreign acquisitions and IPO 
  1on the banking sector? What kind of further reforms are likely to be required? This paper 
addresses these questions and contributes to existing literature from two main aspects. The 
first is to develop a stochastic frontier model by incorporating governance changes and 
overcoming the potential drawbacks of other commonly used techniques to estimate 
efficiency. The second is to provide reliable and up-to-date technical efficiency 
measurement for China’s commercial banks and to jointly analyze the static, selection, 
dynamic effects of corporate governance changes on bank efficiency.  
This paper develops a comprehensive model to investigate bank efficiency and the impact 
of governance changes by combining the advantages of existing models, procedures and 
methods. It adopts a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) that separates the error term into a 
random error ( ) and inefficiency ( ), resulting in more accurate technical efficiency 
estimates. It employs a distance function, allowing for the estimation of a multiple inputs 
and multiple outputs production technology without input price information and 
behavioural assumptions. Moreover, it uses a single-step procedure to overcome serious 
econometric problems suffered by a two-step procedure. In addition, the model incorporates 
Berger et al. (2005) method into the technical inefficiency effects model to jointly examine 
the static, selection, and dynamic effects of corporate governance changes.  
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Using data for the period 1995-2005, the regression results show that bank efficiency has 
been improved in China. The average efficiency level is about 70%, which is moderate 
compared with that of the US or European banks. Corporate governance and risk taking 
characteristics are found to have a significant impact on bank efficiency. State-owned banks, 
on average, still performed poorly although there have been significant improvement in the 
last three years (static effect). Strong selection effects are found for both foreign acquisition 
and initial public offering (IPO). The benefits of foreign acquisition may be realised for a 
longer term. The going-public strategy is found to benefit in the short term but the 
efficiency gains are unsustainable in the long term. These results have important policy 
implications. Moreover, different model specifications shed important light on 
methodological issues of efficiency study, that is, income-based model is proved to be 
superior to earning assets-based model, at least from our data.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Chinese banking industry and 
reviews literature on bank efficiency. Section 3 describes methodologies, including a one-
  2step procedure of stochastic frontier estimation and an output distance function approach. 
Section 4 specifies empirical models and describes data. Section 5 analyses empirical 
results. Section 6 draws conclusions with policy implications. 
2. Chinese banking system and efficiency literature 
2.1 The Chinese banking system 
Prior to economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese banking industry was entirely dominated by 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC). The reform process can be divided into four periods: 
initial institutional restructuring (1979-1984); establishing four big state-owned commercial 
banks (1984-1994); reforming these state banks (1994-2003); ownership reform and foreign 
competition from 2003 onwards (Tang, 2005). During 1979-1984, PBC was broken up into 
two arms: the central bank retaining the name of PBC, and commercial operations 
comprising of four specialized state-owned banks, namely, Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), CCB, ICBC, and BOC. During 1984-1994, institutional restructuring was deepened. 
A two-tier system was created, dominated by these state banks, along with some newly 
established joint-equity commercial banks. Their operations were subject to frequent 
intervention of central and local governments to extend loans to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), resulting in mounting non-performing loans (NPLs).  
The period 1994-2003 was characterised with the commercialization of the state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs). The policy lending function of SOCBs was taken away by 
three newly created state-owned policy banks, although they were still requested to play a 
significant role in policy lending. In helping SOCBs create a sound capital structure, the 
government injected RMB 270 billion through issuing long-term treasure bonds and off-
loaded RMB 1.4 trillion NPLs via four newly established State Assets Management 
Companies. A series of concrete and comprehensive reforms were initiated to transform the 
policy-driven banking system to a market-oriented one, such as removal of credit quotas in 
1998, introduction of capital adequacy requirement and the application of an internationally 
accepted five-classification standard scheme. Moreover, 112 city commercial banks (CCBs) 
were created through restructuring and consolidating the former urban credit cooperatives 
(Wong and Wong, 2001).  
  3Since 2003, bank reform has been accelerated and deepened to bring the SOCBs into 
modern financial enterprises through two new major strategies: foreign acquisition and IPO. 
The government commenced the second round of financial restructuring and injected $45 
billion to BOC and CCB in 2003 and $15 billion to ICBC in 2005, utilizing its excessive 
foreign exchange reserves. They were restructured as modern financial enterprises with a 
better corporate governance structure and subsequently underwent IPO so as to subject their 
operations to market discipline (Tang, 2005).  
Meanwhile, foreign equity participation in domestic banks has been encouraged, motivated 
by the much-needed capital and the urgency of importing superior management and 
technology. All major international banking giants and financial institutions have shown 
great interests in this emerging market, hoping to gain a well-positioned strategic seat 
before its full opening up by 2007. Foreign investors started with a prudent trial investment 
in domestic banks since 2001, followed by a surge in 2004 and a peak in 2005, covering all 
types of domestic banks. More strikingly, after financial restructuring and reform, the 
performance of SOCBs has been improved significantly, attracting considerable foreign 
investment. For example, in 2005 Bank of America acquired 9% stake in CCB and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, together with Merrill Lynch and Li Ka-shing, bought 10% stake in 
BOC. In the same year, Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express signed MOU with 
ICBC, agreeing to acquire a 10% stake (source from various press releases). By acquiring 
equity stakes in domestic banks, foreign investors not only avoid suffering from low 
efficiency claimed for foreign banks in some cases but also reduce substantial costs of 
establishing a branch network to serve their customers. 
China has made remarkable progress in bank reforms, with far-reaching economic 
implications. ICBC, CCB and BOC have emerged to be among the big banks in the world. 
In 2004, CCB was reported as the most profitable bank among the international banking 
giants measured by return on equity. ICBC was listed in Shanghai and Hong Kong in 
October 2006. By the end of 2006, it became the second biggest bank in the world by 
market value.  
The success of bank reform depends heavily on whether banks can really refrain from 
government intervention. Government intervention in lending decision still persists 
although less explicitly. It is also uncertain whether this implicit intervention could be 
reversed in the near future. As discussed in Dobson and Kashyap (2006), the 11th Five-
  4Year Plan has addressed the growing rural-urban and regional inequality and projects to 
balance urban-rural development through urbanization. Therefore, more employment is 
needed to absorb surplus rural labour and SOCBs are more likely to assist in achieving the 
overall goals and to provide necessary finance. This role is in conflict with the commercial 
banks’ economic objectives of profitability and efficiency. The implication is that 
government influence might remain and that the reform of transforming SOCBs to truly 
commercial banks might take longer. 
2.2 Bank efficiency in transition economies and developing counties 
A wealth of literature on bank efficiency has been well established, but mainly in the US 
and European countries
1. During the last decade, more attention has been paid to bank 
efficiency of developing countries and transition economies. In the literature, state-owned 
banks are notorious for being more inefficient over other types of banks for a number of 
reasons. State-owned banks generally functioned as government agents to fulfil national 
development plan and may pursue non-economic goals such as maintaining social stability 
and safeguarding employment. Other reasons include a severe free-rider problem that all 
citizens are theoretic co-owners who are unable to influence the management of state-banks 
and the lack of discipline for managers of inefficient banks (Huibers, 2005).  
Consequently, state ownership is considered to be a source of inefficiency and many 
governments attempt to privatize state-owned banks as an ultimate way of improving bank 
performance. Most studies find improved bank performance after privatization and 
financial liberalization (Williams and Nguyen, 2005; Megginson and Metter, 2002; Gilbert 
and Wilson, 1998), while some others argue that the positive effect may be temporal and 
unsustainable in the long run (Hao et al., 2001; Katib and Mathews, 2000). 
 
Foreign acquisition and initial public offering (IPO) are two commonly used methods of 
privatization. Empirical literature generally concludes that foreign acquisition is associated 
with greater improvements in post-privatization performance than is purely domestically 
privatization (Fries and Taci. 2005; Bonin et al., 2005a, 2005b and Hasan and Marton, 
                                                 
1 Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a valuable survey on financial institutions efficiency studies. 
 
  52003).  IPO is considered as an effective method of privatization than others by minimizing 
suboptimal behaviour and eliminating inefficiencies. Going public not only facilitates the 
adoption of market-oriented disciplines but also improves banks’ corporate governance. 
IPO, as the divestment mechanism of state ownership, has been proved to be a productive 
strategy for privatizing banks in Poland (Huibers, 2005).  
The relationship between performance and corporate governance is often considered under 
the economic theory of principal-agent problem which arises whenever the management of 
an entity is separated from its owner. This problem is compounded for state-owned banks 
because the role of owner—the state is ambiguous, being both the regulator and owner. 
Governance issue in banking industry is even more complicated because of its speciality, 
including strengths of bank regulation and supervision, the opaqueness of bank assets, the 
level of markets development, and institutional environment (Levine, 2004). Appropriate 
governance structure is the one that eliminates inefficiency caused by principal-agent 
problems. Berger et al. (2005) carry out an outstanding study examining the relationship 
between governance changes and bank efficiency by proposing a method that accounts for 
the static, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes simultaneously in one 
model.   
While the literature on bank efficiency in transition and developing countries has been well-
developed during the last decade, only a handful of studies examine the efficiency of the 
Chinese banking sector. Using SFA, Yao et al. (2007), Fu and Heffernan (2005), and Berger 
et al. (2006) examine the relationship between ownership and bank efficiency and 
consistently report improved efficiency level and state-owned banks being the least 
efficient. Employing DEA, Chen et al. (2005) examine the effect of deregulation and find 
state-owned banks outperform other banks, whereas Hu et al. (2006) and Wang et al. (2005) 
come up with an opposite story that joint-stock commercial banks are more efficient than 
state-owned banks. These studies focus on the static effects of different governance 
structures on efficiency. This paper advances the existing literature by examining the 
effects of various ongoing reform measures and risk-taking characteristics on bank 
efficiency over the 1995-2005 for all types of commercial banks in China. To our best 
knowledge, it is the first study adopting an output distance function to estimate bank 
efficiency by jointly examining the static, selection and dynamic effects of governance 
changes, particularly foreign acquisition and IPO, on bank performance in China.  
  63.  Methodologies 
3.1 One-stage SFA model 
A stochastic frontier approach (SFA), independently developed by Aigner, Lovell, and 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), pre-specifies a functional form 
for estimation and decomposes the error term into random error ( ) and inefficiency ( ). 
SFA has been criticized for using a predetermined frontier functional form and pre-assumed 
distribution of the random error and inefficiency. However, the separation of a random 
error from inefficiency improves the accuracy of estimated technical efficiency. Efficiency 
studies employing SFA frequently adopt a two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage 
specifies and estimates a stochastic frontier to estimate inefficiencies for individual firms, 
assuming these inefficiencies are distributed identically. The second stage regresses these 
predicted inefficiencies on a set of firm specific characteristics attempting to explain 
differences in estimated efficiency. This two-stage procedure suffers from serious 
econometric problems, due to its contradictory assumptions on the independence of the 
inefficiency effects in the two stages (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
i v i u
The awareness of the contradiction has promoted the development of the single-stage 
approach in which the potential relationship between the firm specific variables and 
technical efficiency is imposed in a single-stage procedure to estimate the production 
technology and firm efficiencies (Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 
1991; Huang and Liu, 1994; and Battese and Coelli, 1995). With extensive Monte Carlo 
evidence, Wang and Schmidt (2002) strongly recommend the one-stage models.  
 
This study adopts a one-step model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). It assumes that 
non-negative technical inefficiencies are a function of firm-specific and environmental 
variables, and independently distributed as truncations of normal distribution with a 
constant variance, but with means that are a linear function of observable variables. The 
model is a more generalized model than other one-step model by encompassing other 
efficiency estimation models as special cases.  
3.2 Output distance function 
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has been increasingly applied to efficiency study with the recognition of its potential 
advantages. A distance function approach has a number of prominent virtues (Cuesta and 
Orea, 2002; Coelli and Perelman, 2000; Fare et al., 1993; and Grosskopf et al., 1995). A 
major advantage is that a distance function represents multiple-outputs and multi-inputs 
production technology, which facilitates efficiency study for industries employing such 
technology without input price information and behavioural assumption. When price 
information is unavailable or inaccurately measured and/or when behaviour assumptions of 
cost-minimization or profit-maximization are inappropriate or unrealistic, traditional dual 
approach to accounting for multi-outputs production technology, such as cost and profit 
functions, are inapplicable. In this regard, a distance function approach can be used as an 
applicable alternative to the dual approach for the multi-outputs production technology.  
A distance function can be defined in terms of radial input conservation or output 
expansion. This multi-dimensional technological relationship can be represented by the 
technology set, which is a list of the technologically feasible combinations of inputs and 
outputs. If the vector of M inputs is denoted by  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 M x x x x = and the vector of N 
outputs is denoted by , the technology set can be defined by equation (1).   ) ,..., , ( 2 1 N y y y y =
                                (1)  } y produce can x , , : ) , {(
M N y x y x T ℜ ∈ ℜ ∈ = + +
For each input vector x, let P(x) be the set of feasible output vectors y, that are obtainable 
from the input vector x in equation (2). 
} : { ) ( y produce can x y x P M
+ ℜ ∈ =                        (2) 
It is assumed that the technology satisfies the standard axioms, such as convexity, weak 
disposability, as listed in Fare and Primont (1995).  
The output distance function is first introduced by Shephard in 1970. Based on common 
definition of production technology that transforms inputs into outputs, the output distance 
function is defined in terms of the output set P(x), by equation (3).  
          { } ) ( ) / ( : 0 . min ) , ( x P y y x DO ∈ > = θ θ                                                                     (3) 
  8where θ  is the scalar ‘distance’ by which the output vector can be deflated.  
The value of will be less than or equal to one if the output vector, y, is an element 
of the feasible production set of P(x).  
) , ( x y DO
A translog function is selected for empirical representation of the output distance function, 
which is given in equation (4) for I firms producing M outputs using K inputs,  
∑∑ ∑ ∑
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where “O”  indicates an output-oriented distance function and i denotes the ith firm in the 
sample.  
An output distance function must satisfy certain regularity restrictions, including 
homogeneity of degree one in outputs   
∑ =
M
m 1 α ,  and  ,   and     ∑ = =
M
mn M m ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( 0 α ∑ = =
M
km K k ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( 0 γ
and restriction on symmetry 
), ,..., 2 , 1 , ( M n m = =α α  and  ) ,..., 2 , 1 , ( K l k lk kl = = β β . 
Following Lovell et al (1994), homogeneity constraint can be imposed by normalizing the 
output distance function by one of the outputs. The homogeneity property implies that 
) , ( ) , ( y x D y x D O O ω ω = for any  0 > ω and it can be satisfied by output normalizations using 
an arbitrary output in the empirical practice. If the Mth output is chosen for normalization 
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Rearranging equation (5) by moving the distance term ‘ ’ to the right-hand-side of the 
equation and reinterpret it as a traditional SFA disturbance term with a noise ( ) and 
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For the estimation purpose, the left hand side of equation (6) is transformed to be   
rather than  and it becomes a standard SFA model.  
1 ln y
1 ln y −
Simultaneous equation bias might exist when both inputs and outputs in the distance 
function appear as regressors. Coelli and Perelman (1996) argue that the normalization 
procedure for imposing homogeneity of degree one in outputs by one of the outputs results 
in the fact that the output ratios appear in the model rather than output variables. These 
output ratios may be assumed to be exogenous since the output distance function is defined 
for radial expansion of all outputs, given the input levels.   
Morrison Paul et al. (2000) present a complex but general and rich model for the 
representation of production technique and estimation of efficiency by embedding a 
distance function into a SFA framework. This paper borrows the idea and develops a richer 
empirical model to provide more reliable efficiency estimates and possible determinants. 
Our model expands and enriches Morison Paul et al. (2000) model by incorporating Berger 
et al. (2005) method in a one-stage estimation procedure. Such a model inherits all 
statistical and practical virtues of a stochastic frontier approach, a distance function 
approach, one-stage procedure, and Berger et al. (2005) method. In addition, the 
inefficiency effects model also simultaneously examines the effects of bank specific risk 
taking characteristics and macroeconomic conditions.  
  104. Data and empirical models  
In this paper, Chinese commercial banks are classified into four groups: state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-equity commercial banks (JECBs), city commercial 
banks (CCBs), and foreign banks (FBs). The sample contains 310 observations and covers 
all major commercial banks in China, accounting for more than 85% of total banking assets 
and activities. Time period spans eleven years from 1995 to 2005 in which the banking 
industry experienced significant corporate governance changes. Data are collected mainly 
from monthly updated Thompson’s BankScope database and the latest issue of the database 
used in this study is up to the end of 2006. Other sources include Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking (1986-2005), China Statistical Yearbook, and websites of central 
bank, CBRC, and individual banks. The quality of data in China is often questioned, while 
data have been collected from multiple sources and have been carefully cross checked to 
ensure data quality and hence improve the reliability of research findings. 
The commonly used intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) is adopted, which 
views banks as using labour, physical capital, and funds to produce earning assets. The 
treatment of deposits has long been a controversial issue. This paper adopts a dual approach 
that treats the stock value of deposits as an output while treats the costs of deposits as input 
like in Bauer et al. (1993), Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and Chen et al. (2005).  
 
Empirical studies show that efficiency estimates can be sensitive to the specification of 
inputs and outputs and therefore this paper specifies three different combinations of inputs 
and outputs. Particularly, Model 1 is income-based specification which defines two inputs: 
total interest expense ( ) and non-interest expense ( ), and two outputs: net interest 
income ( ) and non-interest income ( ) (Sturm and Williams, 2004; Park and Weber, 
2006). Models 2 and 3 are earning assets-based specification. Model 2 specifies two inputs, 
total interest expense ( ) and labour and physical capital ( ), and three outputs, total 
loans ( ), total deposits ( ) and non-interest income ( ) (Rogers, 1998; Park and 
Weber, 2006). Non-interest income is defined as an additional output to capture the effect 
of increasingly important diversification of bank activities. Model 3 specifies three inputs, 
1 x 2 x
1 y 2 y
1 x 3 x
3 y 4 y 2 y
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1 x 4 x 5 x
3 y 4 y 5 y
The summary statistics of related variables and ratios are presented in Table 1. Foreign 
banks have shown very different characteristics from domestic banks. They are the most 
profitable banks in terms of ROA at 12.27%, and the most cost efficient banks in terms of 
overhead to total assets ratio of 0.91%. All risk taking indicators are the highest, reflecting 
low capital risk, low credit risk, high dependence on wholesales market, and high liquidity 
risk. 
total interest expense ( ), physical capital ( ), and labour ( ), and three outputs, total 
loans ( ), total deposit ( ) and other earning assets ( ).  
Equation (7) is the empirical specification of an output distance function in Translog form.  
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Models 2 and 3; 
        i=1,2,…,N     (7) 
xare inputs and t is a time trend.   




















Outputs and Inputs and other financial figures 
Loans*  19  11  1  115 113 1,676  1,501  322  494  757 
Other earning assets*  17  9  1  77  73  1,007  656  208  325  495 
Deposits*  30  16  1  147 149 2,231  1,795  438  673  1,030 
Net  interest  income  575  306  51  3,163 2,616 42,473 36,853  9,770  12,809  19,658 
Other operating income 376  217  35  1,570  1,502  18,662  9,200  4,385  6,391  9,697 
Fixed  assets  469  402  31  2,684 2,677 52,024 49,064  10,466  14,493  22,396 
Overhead  387  222  16  2,219 2,035 30,694 32,415  6,692  8,758  13,413 
Interest  expense  781  432  71  3,719 4,191 106,420 56,744  11,569  32,283  49,724 
Non-interest  expense  414  239  21  2,374 2,160 35,034 36,830  7,339  9,906  15,192 
ROA  1.65 1.78 12.27  1.36 0.94 0.57  0.29  1.29  1.20  1.07 
Cost  efficiency  1.14 1.11 0.91 1.20 1.16 1.13  1.48  1.24  1.19  1.12 
Total  assets*  39  22  2  200 200 2,886  2,335  555  874  1,336 
Risk taking indicators 
Equity/  Asset  4.90 5.14 31.93  4.65 3.79 4.35  4.08  4.66  4.78  4.57 
  13  14
LLR/total  loans  1.29 1.26 2.33 2.24 1.24 1.53  0.91  2.31  1.99  2.06 
Interbank  fund/deposits 87.94 80.87 268.53 38.76 37.88 52.57  40.00  27.12  57.51  39.11 
Loans/deposits  70.32 72.48 131.94 79.74 76.96 81.42  97.20  80.61  76.79  77.97 
Source: BankScope and authors’ calculation.   
Notes: (1) ROA = return on assets; LLR = loan loss reserve; Cost efficiency = overhead over total assets. Loans, other earning assets, deposits and total assets are presented in RMB billion. 
CCBs = city commercial banks, FB = foreign banks, JECB = joint-equity commercial banks, SOCB = state-owned banks, NO = no governance changes, ALL = all banks in the group, Selection 
foreign = selection with foreign acquisition, Selection listing = selection with listed banks. (2) Variables with a negative or zero value have been added by a constant that equals the absolute 
value of the minimum values plus one in order to avoid taking natural logarithm on zero or negative observations. All monetary variables have been deflated to 1995 price level and input and 
output variables have been mean-corrected by their geographic mean. All types of banks with no governance change are less profitable on average, except for 
CCBs. This may be the reflection that better performing banks have been picked up for 
governance changes or banks have performed better after governance changes, or both. 
CCBs and JECBs with no governance changes are more cost efficient than their group 
average, implying that governance changes generally involve excessive costs at least in 
the short run but its downside effects have been offset fully by improved profitability. 
SOCBs with no governance changes are shown to be less profitable and less cost 
efficient than the group average. Governance changes in SOCBs not only have 
improved profitability but also cost efficiency.  
The inefficiency effects model of one-step Battese and Coelli (1995) model shown in 
equation (8) particularly examines the impact on bank performance of risk taking 
characteristics, corporate governance changes in certain macroeconomic environment.  












where t is a time trend variable;  is a vector of governance indicators;  is a 
vector of risk taking indicators; GDP is GDP index.  
it CG it Risk
Risk taking characteristics are represented by a set of financial ratios. In particular, E/A 
ratio controls for capital risk, loan loss reserve to total loans ratio for credit risk, 
interbank borrowing to total deposits ratio for market risk, and total loans to total 
deposits ratio for liquidity risk.  
E/A ratio presents capital risk and the higher the E/A ratio, the lower the capital risk. It 
should be analyzed in conjunction with the budget constraints argument. Credit risk 
indicator, LLR/Total Loans ratio, measures how much banks provide for unanticipated 
losses from loan default. It reflects banks’ financial strength since loan loss reserve is 
used as a cushion against possible future loan defaults. Banks with higher LLR/Total 
Loans ratio are exposed to lower level of credit risk, and thus are expected to be more 
efficient. The ratio of interbank borrowing to total deposit for each bank measures the 
extent to which a bank specialises in wholesale rather than retail operations. GDP 
growth is included as a proxy for general macroeconomic environment in which banks 
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operate. A time trend variable is also included to capture common effect on efficiency, 
i.e. technical change and policy change.  
A set of governance changes indicators is used to capture the effect of intensified 
contemporary banking reform in China. Berger et al. (2005) highlight the importance to 
analyze static, selection, and dynamic effects on the performance of different groups of 
banks in the same model. Static governance indicators are used to capture the effect of 
maintaining certain types of governance structure over the long term, while selection 
effect indicators reflect the performance of banks being selected for governance 
changes. Dynamic governance indicators explore short-run and long-run effects of 
different types of governance changes by comparing bank performance before 
governance changes with their subsequent performance after changes. The present 
study specifies five static indicators, two selection indicators, two short-run and two 
long-run dynamic indicators. These governance indicators are defined as dummy 
variables and details are presented in Table 2.  
Static indicators, CCBs-No Governance Change, JECBs-No Governance Change, 
SOCBs-No Governance Change, FBs-No Governance Change, represent banks that 
underwent no governance changes, and Listed Bank shows whether a bank has been 
listed on a stock exchange. For all periods, these dummy variables equal 1 for such a 
bank and 0 for all other banks. As shown in Table 2, the share of banks without 
governance changes is 64% of CCBs, 18% of JECBs and 25% of SOCBs in terms of 
the number of banks and 34% of CCBs, 18% of JECBs and 20% of SOCBs in terms of 
total assets. In aggregate, 59% of domestic banks controlling 80% of the total assets 
have experienced governance changes. As to the listing status, only 7 out of 35 banks 
are listed on stock exchanges, accounting for 27% of the total banking assets. The first 
static indicator, CCBs-no governance change, is excluded in the estimation as the base 
case for comparison purpose like in Berger et al. (2005) and Williams and Nguyen 
(2005).  
The selection indicators, Selected for Foreign Acquisition and Selected for Going 
Public, represent banks being selected for foreign acquisitions or IPO. Dummies equal 
1 for all periods for such a bank and 0 for all other banks. In the case of banks 
experiencing both foreign acquisition and going public, both are accounted separately. 
As shown in Table 2, 14 out of 35 banks have been selected for foreign acquisitions, 
controlling 77% of the total bank assets. Selection for going public is accounted up to   17
the end of 2006 in order to take account of three large IPOs of SOCBs, BOC and ICBC. 
Nine domestic banks have been selected for IPOs, controlling 75% of the total bank 
assets in China.  
Short-term dynamic indicators, Foreign Acquisition-ST and Going Public-ST, measure 
the timing following governance changes. The dummy equals 0 prior to governance 
change and 1 starting from the change. Long-term dynamic indicators, Foreign 
Acquisition-LT and Going Public-LT, measure the number of years following a 
governance changes. Long-term dynamic variables equal 0 prior to governance change 
for all banks and 1 after the change. It is important to distinguish long-term and short-
term effects since transition costs may last more than one year and/or banks may return 
back to their previous steady state a few years after governance change. 
Table 2: Corporate governance indicators 
Governance   Definition of dummy variables  Bank No.  TA
Static Governance Indicators      %  % 
CCBs without 
Governance change 
1 without governance change and 0 otherwise   9 (14)  64  34 
JSCBs without 
Governance change 
1 without governance change and 0 otherwise  2 (11)  18  18 
SOCBs without 
Governance change 
1 without governance change and 0 otherwise  1 (4)  25  20 
FBs without 
Governance change 
1 without governance change and 0 otherwise   6 (6)       
Listed Banks  1 for listed banks and 0 otherwise    7(35)  20  27 
Selection Governance Indicators 
Selection for 
Foreign acquisition 
1 with at least one foreign acquisition during 




Selection for Going 
public 
1 with IPO except BOC and ICBC, 0 
otherwise   
9 (35)  26  75 
Dynamic Governance Indicators--ST  
Foreign  acquisition 1 after foreign acquisition, 0 before 
acquisition and all other banks  
    
 Going public  1 after IPO, 0 before IPO and all other banks           Dynamic Governance Indicators--LT 
 Foreign acquisition  Number of years since foreign acquisition, 0 
before acquisition and other banks  
    
 Going public  Number of years since foreign acquisition, 0 
before acquisition and other banks  
        
Notes: * Figures in parentheses are the total number of respective types of banks or total banks in the sample.  
 * TA: total assets.   
5. Empirical results 
5.1  Results of stochastic frontier model 
Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of parameters are reported in Table 3. Results 
from different model specifications are generally consistent with each other. The signs 
of estimates in all three models are as expected and highly significant at 1% level. The 
estimated parameter γ  ( ( ) 2 2 2 / v u u σ σ σ γ + = ) is more than 0.82 and significant at the 
1% level. The LR test of a one-sided error is greater than 160, showing the existence of 
a one-sided error within the composite error term. The positive coefficient on the time 
trend indicates that the production frontier moved upward. In balance, the results are 
well estimated and imply good fitness of the output distance function. Due to similar 
results from the earning assets-based Models 2 and 3, only Model 2 is further analyzed 
along with Model 1. 
Following Fare and Primont (1995) and Coelli and Perelman (1999), the scale elasticity 
is given by  . The negative sum of the first-
order input coefficients in the output distance function estimation indicates the return to 
scale in the production process. The scale elasticities are less than one in all three 




∂ ∂ − =
M
k
k it it it x x y D EE
1









Table 3 Estimated parameters for stochastic output distance function 
 Net interest income y1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Non-interest income y2  0.462 (9.12)***  0.198 (3.47)***   
Total loans y3     
Total deposits y4    0.859 (5.23)***  0.256 (1.55)* 
Other earning assets y5    0.298  (1.95)** 
Total interest expense x1  -0.442 (-5.6)***  -0.415 (-4.7)*** -0.578  (-7.9)*** 
Non-interest expense x2 -0.314  (-3.7)***     
Labour and physical capital x3     -0.404 (-4.5)***   
Physical capital x4       -0.191 (-2.2)** 
Labour x5    -0.047  (-3.1)** 
t  0.003 (0.13)  0.012 (1.12)  0.024 (1.05) 
γ   0.888 (29.6)***  0.860 (27.9)***  0.818 (22.1)*** 
LR  test  194 166 161 
Mean Technical Efficiency  73.43  69.98  73.18 
y2*y2  -0.141 (-7.5)***  -0.139 (-6.1)***   
y2*x1  0.068 (1.82)**  0.017 (0.39)   
y2*x2  -0.062 (-1.6)*     
y2*x3   -0.049  (-1.2)   
y2* t  0.003 (0.33)  -0.008 (-0.8)   
y4* y4     -0.110 (-2.5)**  -0.222 (-2.7)** 
y4*y2   0.275  (3.83)***   
y4*x1    0.110 (2.35)**  -0.016 (-0.4) 
y4*x3   0.075  (1.41)*   
y4*x4    0.008  (0.08) 
y4*x5    0.077  (0.66) 
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y4*t    0.046 (2.55)**  -0.019 (-0.8) 
y5*y5    -0.141  (-2.2)** 
y5*y4    0.377  (3.56)*** 
y5*x1    0.095  (2.02)** 
y5*x4    0.136  (1.98)** 
y5*x5    -0.301  (-4.2)*** 
y5*t    0.026  (1.22) 
x1*x1  0.144 (0.71)  0.053 (1.79)*  -0.023 (-0.8) 
x1*x2  0.002 (-0.04)     
x1*t  -0.019 (-1.8)*  -0.004 (-0.3)  -0.025 (-2.3)** 
x2*x2  0.019 (0.81)     
x2*t  0.030 (265)**     
x3*x3   0.050  (1.91)**   
x3*x1   -0.090  (-1.7)*   
x3*t   0.013  (1.01)   
x4*x4    0.058  (1.49)* 
x4*x1    0.063  (1.16) 
x4*x5    -0.180  (-2.5)** 
x4*t    -0.002  (-0.4) 
x5*x5    0.097  (2.21)** 
x5*x1    -0.013  (-0.2) 
x5*t        0.043 (2.33)** 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values. ‘***’ signifies significance at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10% levels. 
Bank efficiency has improved steadily over the sample period (Figure 1). The average 
estimated technical efficiency is 70%. The most efficient banks are China Merchants 
Bank in Model 1, Bank of Communications in Model 2 and BOC in Model 3, with the 
estimated technical efficiency of 93%, 89% and 93% respectively. The most inefficient 
domestic bank is China Everbright Bank with an efficiency score of about 40%. Wide 
efficiency variations across banks indicate that there is significant potential for 
efficiency improvement in the Chinese banks.        
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The average estimated technical efficiencies of different bank groups are plotted in 
Figure 2a for income-based Model 1 and Figure 2b for earning assets-based Model 2. 
For both models, CCBs are the least efficient domestic banks except for the first four 
years. This is because only a small number of high performing CCBs are included. 
Strikingly, foreign banks are found to be less efficient than their domestic counterparts.  
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In Model 1, the efficiency level tends to increase and converge. JECBs are the most 
efficient group, consistent with the literature as well as general expectation. They have 
a number of advantages over other banks, such as less government intervention and no 
historical financial burden. Reported efficiency level of SOCBs is still low. Although it 
is not surprising, the results are not in line with the considerable reform efforts made by 
the government, such as stripping off NPLs, massive capital injection, and financial 
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restructuring. One possible reason is that it might take time to realize the full effects of 
those reforms. Another possible reason is that government influence on bank operation, 
such as lending decisions, still exists (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). 
In Model 2, the efficiency levels of domestic banks have moved in parallel, a steady 
improvement up to 1999 followed by a stable period. The most efficient bank group is 
SOCBs, a similar finding to Chen et al. (2005). It is in contrast to the main stream 
literature on the relationship between state ownership and efficiency. 
The further exploration of the contradiction arising from two types of models shows 
important methodological implications. As previously defined, Model 1 focuses more 
on the efficiency of income generation (profitability) and Model 2 devotes more 
attention to the efficiency of earning assets production (earning assets growth). Two 
models measure the efficiency of bank operations from different angles and results 
should be interpreted with caution.  
Earning assets are important for banks, whereas they are intermediate outputs and are 
ultimately for the purpose of income generation. Higher efficiency in earning assets 
growing is a sufficient condition, which does not necessarily result in higher efficiency 
in income generation. Efficiency estimates from the earning assets-based model could 
be inflated by the imprudent lending and investing activities. The poor quality of 
rapidly expanded earning assets could result in significant bank inefficiency when 
estimated by an income-based model. Without taking into account asset quality, 
undesirable outputs, such as non-performing loans, are inappropriately treated along 
with earning assets and therefore inflate the efficiency level. For example, JECBs are 
the most efficient bank group, which outperform SOCBs by 9% in the income-based 
model. However, SOCBs are identified to be the most efficient bank group and 
outperform JECBs by 6% in the earning assets-based model. These figures suggest that 
JECBs tend to be more prudent in extending loans and investing activities and more 
profit-oriented, while SOCBs focus more on traditional assets growing activities with 
less attention to assets quality and profitability.  
Comparing Figure 2a and 2b, more valuable information can be found. For the first five 
years up to 1999, efficiency improvement is quicker in Model 2 than in Model 1, 
indicating that banks have focused more on earning assets growth rather than 
profitability. From 2000, the curves become steeper in Figure 2a, while flatter in Figure 2b, suggesting that banks become more profit conscientious instead of pursuing assets 
growth.  
It emerges that the income-based model is superior to earning assets-based models as 
far as our sample banks are concerned, while the latter is complementary. Different 
estimates from two types of models may be taken as a weak indication of relative asset 
quality among banks. In China, a vast amount of accumulated NPLs in SOCBs is a 
major issue plaguing the authority. In effect, it remains unresolved despite being 
transferred to assets management companies. Due to insufficient NPL data, its effects 
on efficiency have not been properly controlled in this study. However, different model 
specifications partially reflect relative asset quality among different bank groups.  
The estimated efficiencies of individual SOCBs are plotted in Figure 3a for Model 1 
and Figure 3b for Model 2. Efficiency levels have increased in general. BOC and CCB 
outperform the other two SOCBs. ABC is the least efficient bank in Model 1, while it is 
as efficient as other SOCBs in Model 2. Wide dispersion in Model 1 implies large 
differences in the efficiency of income generation among SOCBs. In Model 2, the 
efficiency gaps among SOCBs are close up to 1998 and the subsequent convergence in 
efficiency show small differences in the efficiency of earning assets. Comparing 
Figures 3a and 3b, once again, underscores the superiority of the income-based model 
over the earning assets-based model.  
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5.2  Results of technical inefficiency effects model 
It is an important part of efficiency study to predict the structure of production 
technology and to estimate efficiency scores for individual banks. However, the second 
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efficiencies. The results from the inefficiency effects model of three different 
specifications are reported in Table 4. 
The coefficients on the static governance indicators reflect the differences of long-term 
performance from the control group—CCBs with no governance changes. Coefficients 
on FBs--No Governance Change ( 1 δ ) are insignificant with mixed signs, indicating that 
the efficiency of foreign banks are not significantly different from that of the control 
group. Coefficients on JECBs--No Governance Change ( 2 δ ) and SOCBs--No 
Governance Change ( 3 δ ) are negative and significant at the 1% or 5% level, indicating 
that JECBs and SOCBs are significantly more efficient than CCBs. One exception is 
SOCBs in Model 1 where they do not significantly outperform CCBs, suggesting poor 
performance of SOCBs in terms of income generation. Coefficients on Listed Banks 
( 4 δ ) suggest that listed banks are more efficient in income generation than CCBs at the 
1% significance level, but with less magnitude in producing earning assets. Listed 
banks are shown to operate more prudently in investment and credit expansion. 
 
Table 4 Estimated parameters of technical efficiency effects model 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Static governance indicators 
FBs-No change ( 1 δ )  0.156 (0.89)  -0.043 (-0.4)  -0.254 (-1.4) 
JECBs-No change ( 2 δ )  -0.665 (-4.5)***  -0.495 (-4.4)*** -0.392 (-2.6)** 
SOCBs-No change ( 3 δ )  -0.256 (-1.1)  -0.576 (-2.9)**  -0.472 (-1.9)** 
Listed banks ( 4 δ )  -0.743 (3.95)***  0.026 (0.25)  0.330 (2.25)** 
Selection governance indicators 
Foreign acquisition ( 5 δ )  -0.431 (4.1)***  -0.207 (-3.3)**  -0.221 (-2.6)** 
IPO ( 6 δ )  0.099 (0.49)  -0.406 (-3.6)*** -0.715 (-4.9)*** 
Dynamic governance indicators—short term 
Foreign acquisition ( 7 δ )  -0.351 (-1.1)  0.242 (1.73)*  0.090 (0.43) 
IPO ( 8 δ )  -0.707 (-1.7)*  -0.792 (-3.5)*** -0.445 (-0.2) 
Dynamic governance indicators-long term 
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IPO ( 10 δ )  0.064 (0.52)  -0.039 (-0.32)  0.003 (0.01) 
Risk taking indicators 
Equity/asset ( 11 δ )  -0.287 (-3.86)***  0.004 (0.07)  0.083 (1.19) 
LLR/loans ( 12 δ )  -0.050 (-1.4)*  -0.023 (-0.9)  -0.061 (-1.7)* 
Interbank 
fund/deposits( 13 δ )  0.088 (2.17)**  0.173 (5.83)***  0.237 (4.67)*** 
Loans/deposits ( 14 δ )  0.099 (1.25)  0.596 (4.32)***  0.099 (0.68) 
Time ( 15 δ )  -0.096 (-5.4)***  -0.124 (-6.5)*** -0.106 (-4.8)*** 
GDP ( 16 δ )  -0.219 (-0.6) 
 
 -0.077 (-0.4)  -0.058 (-1.9)** 
Notes: This table reports only the results related to governance changes and banks’ risk taking behaviour. 
FB=foreign banks, ‘No change’=no governance change, JECB=joint-equity commercial banks, SOCB=state-owned 
commercial banks, or the Big Four, IPO=initial public offering, assets=total bank assets, loans=total bank loans, 
LLR=loan loss reserve. 
The coefficients on Foreign Acquisition ( 5 δ ) are negative and significant at 1% or 5% 
level, suggesting that foreign acquisition can improve bank efficiency. An alternative 
explanation is that foreign investors may have cherry-picked good domestic banks to 
invest. Examining the same coefficient from different models, it appears that foreign 
acquisition is more income-generating efficient than asset growth efficient. The 
estimated coefficients on IPO ( 6 δ ) show that IPO has little effect on income efficiency 
but has a significant and positive effect on asset growth. The Chinese government has 
focused on restructuring SOCBs to have them listed in the stock markets, but our 
results show that SOCBs have improved their asset value more than their profits in the 
restructuring process.   
The estimated coefficients on Foreign Acquisition-ST ( 7 δ ) and Foreign Acquisition-LT 
( 9 δ )  show that foreign acquisition has led to efficiency improvement but not 
statistically significant. This is because foreign acquisition peaked in 2005, the final 
year of our sample and therefore the major effects have not been reflected. In the 
earning-assets models, the estimated coefficients show a negative short-term impact of 
foreign acquisition but a positive impact in the long run. The short-term efficiency 
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acquisition. In the long term, foreign ownership participation tends to have a significant 
impact on efficiency. This result has important policy implications, since encouraging 
foreign participation in domestic banks is an important element of the Chinese bank 
reform strategy.  
IPO-ST ( 8 δ )  and  IPO-LT ( 10 δ ) quantify the dynamic effects of the going public 
strategy. In Model 1, the estimated coefficients on  8 δ  and  10 δ   imply that IPO is 
associated with significant efficiency gains in the short run. However, this gain cannot 
be sustained in the long run. For the earning-assets models, results also show 
unfavourable long-term effects of IPO. One possible reason is that operational and 
managerial weaknesses may be covered up in order to be listed in the stock market, 
resulting in short-term gains. After listing, if banks take no effective measures to 
thoroughly overcome these weaknesses, short term gains are unsustainable in the long 
run.  
IPO is another major element of China’s bank reform strategy. Domestic banks, 
especially SOCBs, are encouraged to be listed in the stock markets. The strategy is 
based on the belief that IPO could impose market pressure on SOCBs to direct 
management’s attention away from its traditional goal of growing assets and market 
share to profitability and long-term viability. Our results suggest that IPO by itself is 
not sufficient to result in better performance. Without significant improvement in the 
quality of management team, managerial capability and skills, without fundamentally 
changing away from management traditions of being an assistant of government, IPO 
would have no effect on improving efficiency. However, given three significant IPOs, 
CCB, BOC and ICBC in 2005 and 2006, it may be too early to look for strong evidence 
of efficiency improvement.  
In Model 1, a negative coefficient of the E/A ratio suggests that banks subject to hard 
budget constraints are more efficient. It confirms our hypothesis that a soft budget is a 
source of inefficiency because it causes a moral hazard problem. If banks are subject to 
a hard budget constraint, they have to raise capital from shareholders and hence they 
need to be more efficient to attract more capital.  In earning assets-based models, E/A 
ratio is found to have a negative effect on efficiency. Results from different models are 
conflicting in the sense that banks subject to a soft budget constraint are less efficient in 
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evidence that a soft budget constraint is associated with moral hazards, leading to a 
quick expansion in earning assets but low efficiency in income generation. Again, it 
provides evidence for the superiority of an income-based model over an earning assets-
based model, especially in a situation where assets quality is poor.  
LLR/Total Loans ( 12 δ ) ratio is found to have a negative impact on inefficiency in all 
models, suggesting banks taking less credit risk are more efficient. Interbank 
fund/Deposits ( 13 δ ) and Total Loans/Deposits ( 14 δ ) are found to have a positive impact 
on inefficiency and most are statistically significant. The results show that banks are 
less efficient if they depend more on borrowing from the wholesale market than 
collecting deposits from the retail market. A negative coefficient on the time trend in 
the inefficiency effect model means that inefficiencies tended to decrease by 5% per 
year. The negative sign of the coefficient on GDP growth suggests that favourable 
macroeconomic condition of an economy has a positive impact on bank performance.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines technical efficiency and the impact of corporate governance and 
risk-taking behaviour on bank performance in China during 1995-2005. The estimated 
average efficiency is 70%, suggesting a large potential for efficiency improvement. 
After many years of reforms, SOCBs still dominate the banking industry and their 
efficiency levels are still low compared with JECBs despite significant improvement in 
the past three years.  
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Our data provide adequate information for constructing a stochastic output distance 
function to examine the static, selection and dynamic effects of corporate governance 
changes and risk-taking behaviour on bank efficiency. JECBs are found to be the most 
efficient group, while foreign banks are the least efficient (static effects). The selection 
effect indicators provide an economic justification for the opening up policy. 
Associated with a significant cherry-picking effect (selection effects), foreign 
participation in domestic banks can improve efficiency in the long run (dynamic effect). 
A cherry-picking effect is also found in the Chinese banks which had undergone an IPO 
to gain more assets. Banks with IPO have realized efficiency gains in the short term, 
but such gains may not be sustained in the long run. This has serious policy 
implications on bank reform in China. What it implies is that IPO by its own virtue   28
does not necessarily result in efficiency gain. The underlying reasons need to be 
carefully investigated and this reform strategy should be re-considered more carefully 
with a focus on fundamental changes. Moreover, banks subject to a hard budget tend to 
be more prudential in risk taking and therefore more efficient than those subject to a 
soft budget, implying that there is scope for improving efficiency of the Big Four 
through a harder budgetary discipline, which has been conducted through IPO over the 
last two years for CCB, BOC and ICBC.  
This paper has also contributed to the literature with methodological concerns. It has 
found that an income-based model is superior to an assets-earning model, especially 
when assets quality is poor. It has implications on the choice of models when studying 
bank efficiency, especially in countries like China. Our suggestion is that both models 
should be used since the investigation from different models could yield more valuable 
information in order to have an objective and accurate judgement on bank performance.  
During the past few years, the Chinese government has speeded up bank reform by 
allowing foreign investment and SOCBs to be listed in the stock markets. The market 
reaction to the listing of CCB, BOC and ICBC has been surprisingly positive and the 
share prices of these banks are now much higher than their IPO prices. One critical 
question is whether the bullish market is driven by the fundamental changes in these 
banks, or by a positive expectation on China’s economic growth, or by pure speculation. 
The results in this paper show that IPO can have a short term positive effect but such an 
effect can fade in the long term. This implies that the future of SOCBs depends on their 
own ability to improve efficiency and profitability and IPO is at best the first step to 
improve such ability. 
The success of bank reform also depends on whether banks can be essentially freed 
from government intervention. Government intervention in lending decision still 
persists but less explicitly. It is uncertain whether this implicit intervention could be 
reversed in the near future.    29
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